

## Structure of Organized Crime: An Evolutionary Viewpoint

Asma Wahab

MS Scholar University of Lahore [at-asma445@gmail.com](mailto:at-asma445@gmail.com)

### Abstract

Owing to tremendous advancements in communication, transportation, and technology, organized crime has become a worldwide issue. Moreover, it is clear that the globalization of organized crime has given rise to a wide range of intricate organizational structures inside these groups. This much is clear. Several factors working together have accelerated this transformation, hence it is imperative to create globally connected networks driven by market forces. Many research have shown how very dynamic and firmly based in basic complexity modern criminal organizations are. The fact that these companies use networks, groups, and clusters with different sizes and compositions defies common opinion. Moving between several local locations is not unusual for global criminal organizations. The tendency of criminal organizations to look for fresh opportunities on a global scale and the efficiency of such structures in sustaining a broad range of illicit activities may help to explain this trend. Preliminary survey results from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Criminal Justice in 2002 indicated that particular organized criminal groups in 16 countries fit into one of five typologies: the standard hierarchy, the regional hierarchy, the clustered hierarchy, the core group, or the criminal network. The five various typologies were these. Through identification of these categories and establishment of a link with the observable sets. The intricate network of connections amongst the several people who are part of Colombia's most well-known cartels is an excellent case study example. In that it is split up into several divisions, the corporation resembles a huge global conglomerate rather well. The president and vice president oversee all facet of the American drug trafficking organization, including raw material acquisition, completed product distribution, and financial administration. Foreign cells supervise the importing, storing, transiting, and money laundering of illicit substances. Experts have already noticed that "Russian" gangs in the US have unique organizational structures and an opportunity-oriented mentality. The researchers set the whole history of these criminal groups at their feet to show how flexible and changeable they are. These networks also had dispersed organization, with no one individual or group obviously

in charge of the circumstances. They also used outside global resources and partners with the required knowledge to enable their activities.

### **Introduction**

Because they do all and everything to make money, criminal organizations are sometimes referred to as "entrepreneurial crime". This is done to enable involvement of criminal groups in any kind of economic venture. Organized criminal groups use such flexible tactics, so it is expected that the twenty-first century's fastest-growing and largest cybercrime market would keep increasing. Though transnational terrorist organizations and transnational organized crime operate in essentially different ways from an ideological, logistical, and tactical perspective, some security experts are worried that "business liaisons" between these two groups pose a serious threat to the safety of the entire world. Numerous scholars have proposed that emphasizing network research—both offline and online—is the best way to fight organized crime. This is thus because changeable network architecture is used by numerous criminal groups. All the experts agree that a range of distinct measures will be needed to effectively fight organized crime. These include: a greater political commitment by governments around the globe to recognize the pernicious and transnational nature of organized crime and to combat it; a great need for cooperation for mutual legal assistance and sharing information - in the form of international agreements and treaties among states and within states - among departments and levels of government, to develop and implement a multi-national and multi-disciplinary approach; a need for increasing public awareness regarding organized crime with a focus on reducing the demand for illegal products and services - to prevent corruption at all levels in the civil society and to enhance loyalty to the legitimate state governing system; the need for strategic, systematic and pro-active collection, analysis and sharing of intelligence, especially, financial intelligence, on emerging groups and areas such as cybercrime, identity thefts and computer frauds - keeping within the boundaries of civil liberty; a need for pro-active development and application of the legal apparatus; and for “a systematic threat assessment of known organized crime groups through collecting information on their criminal activities, financial sophistication, violence potential, market/territory and ability to corrupt” as well as through network analysis techniques; and finally, a need for extensive training of law enforcement communities internationally about the complexity of transnational organized crime and the tools for combating it. The UN research revealed that the headquarters of two criminal

networks with traits evocative of organized crime were located in the Caribbean, while the headquarters of the other two networks were located in the Netherlands. The highest ranked people were seen to regularly engage in activities that fit into all four categories, hence it is logical to assume that they organized their specialized criminal operations through a larger network of individual criminal contacts. The networks conducted a vast array of illicit operations, varying in size and kind. The writers concluded that there are most likely a great deal more of these networks even if only a limited number were found throughout the research. These gangs, in their opinion, are a rising phenomena and a model for the contemporary active organized criminal organizations. In 1999, Williams and Woessener looked into the issue of nuclear material being sold unlawfully over international borders. Nine distinct criminal organizations in all were found, and they were not all the same as the kind of organization that was outlined in the previously cited UN research. "Comrade" criminals include all the following categories of criminals: hybrid trafficking gangs, transnational mafia, astute transnationals, shrewd smuggling networks, criminally owned corporations, and opportunistic amateurs. The drug cartels that operate in Columbia are among the most intriguing illustrations of complex network structures. The company is divided up into a number of departments, just like a big international conglomerate would be. From their headquarters, the drug trafficking organization is governed by its president and vice presidents. The divisions abroad handle money laundering, narcotics distribution, storage, and importation. As Paoli (1998) notes, mafia consortiums are the outcome of a long-standing social evolution in which members employ them to accomplish a variety of objectives. There has been a lengthy period for this progression. This makes it feasible to have a more thorough knowledge of the flexibility and resilience of mafia organizations in the face of changing political and economical circumstances. Page 90 has the assigned source. The majority population of Cali is Colombian. Many media sources present the leaders of Colombian cartels as having power over the different cells that comprise the organization as well as the organization as a whole. According to Rush (1999), street gangs are in charge of directly distributing cocaine and the related money laundering activities. The head of drug cartels in Guyana and Colombia are the subject of this academic study. Professionals employed in the financial sector, financial advisers provide direction to both individuals and companies operating in the sector. Their experience is spread throughout many different fields, but logistics and transportation should be the key

subjects of conversation. Supervision of the company's financial operations and records falls to the Head Bookkeeper. They are a must to ensure that every financial statistic is accurate and up to date. Comparable responsibilities to those mentioned above are involved in the division or department's financial management and oversight. Under this heading are duties include managing departmental funds, carrying out all financial obligations, and offering advice and assistance in these areas. A "cash house sitter" is a person hired to watch a house while the owner is away and who gets paid for doing so. Many cars are stored and repaired at the Motor Pool. The Motor Pool maintains and repairs a large number of cars. The distribution of cocaine by a person or group participating in the activity Added Groups to Consider More precisely, Shelley (2002) concentrates on the network architecture both locally and internationally of the former Yugoslavia. These groups have strong roots in the communities where they operate and together they engage in a broad range of illicit operations. The hierarchical structure of the Sicilian mafia and the organizational framework found among Albanian organized criminal gangs are similar, claims Xhudo (1996). An underbosses and bosses network built on marriage and family ties distinguishes the Sicilian mafia. Beare (2000) wrote about research that revealed the criminal gangs in Russia and its satellite republics had a tripod-shaped organizational structure. It is these organizations who commit crimes. Three main groups carry out their operations according to this arrangement: professional criminals, underground companies, and the bureaucracy, which consists of politicians and security guards. The three circles are functionally divided, and at the highest levels they are connected. Data collected in 2002 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicates that "Russian" organized crime in the United States is a loose confederation of 12–15 distinct criminal gangs. Between 500 and 600 people make up this group; they are all from Eastern European countries including Georgia, Dagestan, Russia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Participants in these flexible and adaptable networks are chosen and sent out as needed to exploit new criminal activities by using their unique skill set and characteristics. This happens in such calm surroundings. Concurrently, people have the chance to gain financial resources and professional skills. There doesn't seem to be a well established hierarchy and the de facto head of state seems to be a single individual. In a similar spirit, Finckenauer and Waring (1998) discovered that "Russian" organized criminal groups operating in the US have unique organizational structures and characteristics motivated by opportunity. Two hundred well-known

Russian criminal groups were operating in fifty-eight different countries, according to an examination conducted by the authors. Eight or nine of these groups still had direct links to Russia, and there were maybe fifteen of them with bases in the US. Furthermore shown was the extreme flexibility and dynamic nature of these criminal groups. They worked as networks, and the leaders of these networks were selected according to their special personalities and skill sets. In the lack of a cohesive leadership structure, these groups depended on outsiders with the knowledge and skills required to back their illegal activities. Still, the absence of a legal structure and a single authority led to internal strife and violence (Finckenauer & Waring, 1998). Researchers investigating the situation in South-East Europe (SE Europe Stability Pact, 2000) found some organizational trends using the previously mentioned sources. These patterns comprised, among other things, cell-like forms, hierarchical and horizontal arrangements. Some of these subcultures were supposed to have originated elsewhere in the world or to have been shaped by transnational organizations or individuals. New groupings were frequently created on the basis of ethnic and familial relationships; but, historical connections and economic interests also contributed to the creation of these new configurations. Some of the occurrences were the outcome of changing social, political, and economic circumstances, while others were the outcome of the cooperation of groups involved in extortion and racketeering. The legal economy gains from the money made by illegal activity, much as respectable businesses have been known to use criminal tactics including violence, corruption, and the exploitation of the public and public workers. The following transnational criminal activities are suspected of these groups: the extensive illegal smuggling of consumer goods (especially cigarettes), the facilitation of illegal immigration, human trafficking (mostly for the purpose of sexual exploitation), drug trafficking, crimes against intellectual property, and crimes against the state. Like any other legal firm, it was essential to be able to consistently provide a sizable volume of excellent products at competitive prices. Bryan (2000) once said something that aptly captures this trait of criminal gangs: If the government approved their acts, transnational criminals might be celebrated as the forerunners and inventors of globalization. To keep a competitive advantage over their competitors, they have embraced the advantages of globalization, created an exceptional culture of efficiency and responsibility within the company, and created flexible policy. They have succeeded, prospered, and grown despite the fact that they have stayed totally hidden in a constantly changing global market (p. 1).

Because organized criminal gangs use such flexible tactics, Williams (2001) claims that cybercrime—the biggest and fastest growing business of the twenty-first century—will only get bigger. As far as he is concerned, criminal groups use the Internet to look for fresh business prospects, just like reputable firms do. Among the several traits that criminal organizations have is the capacity to spot and grasp chances to start new illegal businesses and projects. Online business and the Internet have spread so far that before, a wide range of hitherto unexplored channels may be used in order to generate illicit income. He gave a number of instances, including big-scale theft and fraud, Internet-based stock frauds, cyber-extortion, jurisdictional arbitrage—cybercrime committed in countries lacking the necessary legal frameworks to prosecute it—and the growing use of the Internet for sophisticated money laundering. Had organized crime gangs and terrorist groups ever collaborated? Apart from the expanding "business liaisons" between criminal groups of different nationalities, there is also a major transformation in the organizational structure of criminal groups. Though there are operational, logistical, and ideological differences as well as chances for mutual benefit cooperation, several experts (Sanderson, 2004, UK Secretary of State, 2003, for example) have described transnational terrorist groups as a clear threat to global security. Criminal conduct and the already porous regulations governing international financial transactions may be promoted by terrorist groups. This is so because terrorist groups need money, access to state-of-the-art communication technology, small guns and other weapons, including chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as help relocating illegals and weapons. Sanderson issues a caution that the threat to the United States of America and other nations is becoming more sophisticated and calls for a highly specialized and flexible response (p. 50). This alert coincides with the growing number of terrorist organizations combining with organized crime syndicates to create hybrid criminal-terrorist enterprises. Head of the US Terrorism Research Center Neal Pollard said that transnational criminal groups, especially those engaged in drug distribution, collaborate with terrorist groups. Insurgents linked to the Shining Path and the FARC have offered drug production and trafficking organizations in South America mercenary security support. Several sources state that the Palestinian PFLP-GC has been using Lebanon's infrastructure to help in narcotics trafficking. Though there is a far greater risk involved in "traditional" fund-raising techniques like kidnapping and bank robbery, terrorist groups are able to make large profits for their efforts. The provision of established routes for the drug and weapon smuggling by this

organization may be one source of the logistical support that terrorist groups need to move people, weapons, and supplies in a covert way. Pollard conjectures that there is a chance that some terrorist groups and global organized criminal networks may cooperate together for mutual advantage. Whereas the former might utilize fear to get political power, the latter might try to get around the law. States would have to reassess their policies, he believes, if this form of collaboration spreads.

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